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Introduction
There are many situations where rms do not fully know the demand conditions on the market. For example, when a rm is entering a new market or when a new product is introduced, rms need to learn over time how the demand for their good depends on the price they set and on their competitors' prices.
Similarly, changes in market regulation can also lead to demand uncertainty. In such situations rms need to learn about demand conditions to nd the optimal price or production level.
A natural way to learn about unknown demand conditions is to gather market data and estimate the demand function. Then this estimated function can form the basis for determining prices or quantities.
This process can be modeled with least squares learning (LSL) . LSL consists of two parts: estimation and a decision rule. In the estimation part agents estimate an unknown relationship between variables with OLS regression and then they use the estimated function to determine their optimal action. If the functional form in the estimation is correctly specied, i.e. agents have observations about all the relevant variables and these variables are included in the regression in the correct functional form, then LSL leads to the rational expectations equilibrium, see Bray (1982) , Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for example. However, since the true relationship is unknown, it might occur that agents use a misspecied functional form in the regression. The eect of such misspecication was analyzed in the Industrial Organization literature, see Kirman (1975 Kirman ( , 1983 , Gates et al. (1977) , Brousseau and Kirman (1992) , Kopányi (2013) and Anufriev et al. (2013) . Misspecied LSL leads to a so-called self-sustaining equilibrium in which rms do not learn the true demand function correctly but they end up in a situation where 1. they are choosing the prot-maximizing price or quantity subject to their estimated function and 2. in the equilibrium their estimation is correct in the sense that the price or demand they expect to get (based on their estimation) coincides with the actual realization.
1 This kind of outcome is unrelated to any benchmark outcomes of the standard static model under complete knowledge about the demand structure, such as the Nash equilibrium or the collusive outcome.
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In this paper we take an intermediate step between the aforementioned branches of the literature.
We take a slight departure from the correctly specied version of LSL by assuming that rms use all the relevant variables in the regression (i.e. the prices set by their competitors) and that the functional 1 Thus, their estimation is correct in the equilibrium point but not out of equilibrium. 2 We must note that the result that misspecied learning can lead to dierent outcomes than a correctly specied learning rule holds not only for least squares learning. Bayesian learning leads to similar results depending on whether the likelihood function is correctly specied or not, see and the references therein. For market models with misspecied Bayesian learning see and Schinkel et al. (2002) for example. form they use is correctly specied locally but not globally.
3 This situation is of particular interest as the correctly specied and misspecied versions of LSL lead to substantially dierent outcomes and it is unclear whether a small misspecication in the learning method, which can easily occur and is hard to detect, is enough to prevent convergence to the Nash equilibrium. As our results show, LSL can lead both to the Nash equilibrium and to a self-sustaining equilibrium. Moreover, a third kind of outcome, which was not present in previous models, can also be reached: the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. In this equilibrium some rms charge higher prices than others and they focus only on a small part of the market. A remarkable feature of this outcome is that even though rms observe a perfect t, the outcome can be suboptimal for some rms in the sense that they could make a higher prot by focusing on the whole market. However, in some situations it can be optimal to focus on only one part of the market.
As a framework of the analysis we consider a modied version of the circular road model introduced by Salop (1979) . Three rms produce a homogeneous good. Firms are located along a circular road, in equidistant locations. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the circle. When a consumer wants to buy the good, it needs to visit one of the rms. Transportation is costly, consumers face a xed transportation cost per distance unit. Thus, the total cost of buying the good from a specic rm is given by the sum of the price the rm asks and the transportation costs. Demand is inelastic, each consumer is assumed to buy exactly one unit of the good, at the lowest possible total cost. We introduce heterogeneity on the consumer side. There are two types of consumers, one type faces low transportation cost while the other type faces a high one.
Firms do not know the market structure and they use LSL to learn the demand function they face.
The true demand function is piecewise linear but rms approximate it with a linear function. Hence the approximation can be locally correct but globally incorrect as a rm can get a correct approximation for at most one of the linear parts of the true demand function. In this paper we investigate which outcomes LSL can lead to in this situation. We analytically show that the model has three kinds of equilibria. When rms use all past observations in the estimation, LSL typically leads to a self-sustaining equilibrium. In this equilibrium rms choose the price that maximizes their expected prot subject to their beliefs about demand conditions and their beliefs are correct in equilibrium but they are incorrect out of equilibrium.
On the other hand, when not all but only the most recent observations are used in the estimation, rms reach either the symmetric Nash equilibrium or the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. In this asymmetric learning-equilibrium two rms charge a low price and the third one asks a high price. The high-price rm attracts the high-type consumers only whereas the other two rms serve both consumer types. The 3 As we will explain later, they approximate a piecewise linear function with a linear one.
intuition behind this equilibrium is that the high-price rm does not attract low-type consumers, therefore it underestimates the demand at low prices and it does not perceive it protable to charge a lower price.
We analytically investigate which conditions determine the outcome of the learning process and we run numerical simulations to evaluate how frequently the dierent outcomes are reached.
Least squares learning was applied in market competition in other papers as well. See Anufriev et al. (2013) for an overview of the literature on misspecied LSL. Our results are in line with the ndings of this literature when rms use all past observations in the regression. In the Nash equilibrium and in the asymmetric learning-equilibrium, perceived demand functions are correctly specied in the neighborhood of the equilibrium price. This makes these outcomes more robust than the self-sustaining equilibria in Brousseau and Kirman (1992) and Anufriev et al. (2013) in the sense that in case of an SSE a rm would discover that its perceived demand function is misspecied by choosing a slightly dierent price. This is not the case for the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium.
4 Tuinstra (2004) takes a similar approach as we do in the sense that he considers a perceived demand function that is locally correct but globally incorrect. In his paper, the perceived demand function is the linear approximation of the true nonlinear demand function at the current price vector (i.e. the perceived demand function matches the function value and the slope of the true demand function at the current price).
5 Thus, the approximation is correct at the equilibrium point only, whereas it is correct in a neighborhood of an equilibrium in our model (in case of the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium). Another important dierence is that rms focus only on their own price eect in the approximation in Tuinstra's paper while they take into account the prices of other rms as well in our model. The paper is structured as follows. The circular road model is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss least squares learning and we derive the equilibria of the model. We analyze the stability of the equilibria as well. Simulation results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are presented in Appendix A while robustness checks are reported in Appendix B.
2 The circular road model The circular road model, one of the baseline models of horizontal product dierentiation, was introduced by Salop (1979) . In this section we rst review a simplied version of the model that is relevant for our 4 Note, however, that this dierence is due to the dierent informational structure of the models. In Brousseau and Kirman (1992) and Anufriev et al. (2013) rms can observe their own actions only, whereas they have full information about the actions in our model. 5 One of the equilibrium concepts in Silvestre (1977) is based on similar conditions. analysis and then we introduce heterogeneity on the consumer side.
Homogeneous consumers
Consider the market for a homogeneous good that is produced by three rms. Firms simultaneously and independently set the price of the good. Production costs are given by the same function for each rm:
C i (q i ) = cq i for each rm i, where q i is the production level of rm i and c > 0 is a parameter. Firms are located along a circular road, in equal distance from each other. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the circle, their mass (or equivalently the circumference of the circle) is normalized to 1.
Consumers need to visit one of the rms to purchase the good. They move along the circular road, facing a transportation cost s per distance unit. If the minimal distance between rm i and a given consumer is x, then the consumer's total cost for buying the good from rm i is p i + sx, where p i is the price charged by rm i and sx is the total transportation cost. 6 Demand is inelastic: each consumer buys exactly one unit of the good. Furthermore, consumers are assumed to buy the good at the lowest possible cost, thus from the rm for which the sum of the price and the total transportation cost is the lowest. An alternative interpretation of the model is that the circle represents the product space and the location of consumers determines their preferences for the dierent products. Consumers choose a product based on the prices and on the distances from their ideal product, which corresponds to their location.
Firms can drive out each other from the market by choosing a suciently low price. When a consumer at the location of a rm is better-o by visiting another rm, then the rst rm will not attract any consumers. This setup results in demand functions that are discontinuous and which consist of piecewise linear parts. This one-shot game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, in which each rm charges the price p = c + s 3 , see Tirole (1988) , p. 283 for the proof. Having discussed how the basic model works, let us introduce heterogeneity on the consumer side.
Heterogeneous consumers
Let us consider the same market structure as before but suppose that there are two types of consumers.
The types dier with respect to the transportation cost they face: low-type consumers face a unit cost of s while high-type consumers pay a unit cost of S, where s < S. The amount of consumers of each type is normalized to 1, both types are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the circular road. Firms cannot distinguish the two types, they cannot price discriminate between dierent consumers.
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6 It is assumed that rms cannot price discriminate so they cannot charge dierent prices to consumers from dierent locations. 7 We also assume that resale is not possible. Similarly to the case with homogeneous consumers, rms can drive each other out of the market by choosing a suciently low price. Moreover, rms can also be driven out of one part of the market only:
It can occur that a rm attracts high-type consumers but not low-type ones. Consider for example the situation p j + 1 3 s < p i < p j + 1 3 S. In this case the low-type consumer that is located at the position of rm i buys from rm j rather than from rm i. Consequently, rm i does not attract low-type consumers. On the other hand, the high-type consumer at the location of rm i prefers rm i to rm j. Thus, in the given situation, rm j drives rm i out of the market for low-type consumers but not for high-type consumers.
Demand functions are discontinuous and consist of piecewise linear parts again. There are more parts than under homogeneous consumers since rms can be driven out of multiple subparts of market in this case. We do not report the exact formula for the demand function here as it is not important to know it for understanding the results of the paper. The relevant linear parts of the demand function are derived in Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the demand and prot functions of rm i when the other two rms do not drive each other out of the market for either consumer type. We can see that the demand function indeed consists of linear parts. There are 7 linear parts, they correspond to the following cases (as p i increases): 1. rm i serves the whole market; 2. low-type consumers are served by rm i only, high-type consumers are served by rms i and j; 3. low-type consumers are served by rm i only, high-type consumers are served by all 3 rms; 4. low-type consumers are served by rms i and j, high-type consumers are served by all 3 rms; 5. both consumer types are served by all three rms; 6. rm i serves high-type consumers only, the other two rms serve both consumer types; and 7. rm i is completely driven out of the market. We can see from the prot function that the prot-maximizing decision of rm i in the given situation is to drive the other two rms out of the market for the low-type consumers but not for the high-type, as the prot maximum is reached in the third case.
The model with heterogeneous consumers has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Proposition 2.1 species the equilibrium price. The proof of the proposition is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.1 The Salop model with three rms and two types of consumers has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This equilibrium is symmetric, with all three rms charging the price p N = 2Ss 3(S+s) + c and serving both consumer types.
Note that the proposition rules out the existence of asymmetric Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium price is increasing in both s and S. The intuition behind this result is the following. When transportation costs are higher, it is harder for rms to attract consumers that are located farther away from them (or equivalently, it is more costly for consumers to visit rms that are farther away from them). This reduces competition, rms gain more market power and the equilibrium price increases consequently.
It can be seen that
∂s , that is s has a larger impact on the equilibrium price than S does. To understand this result, note the following. When a transportation cost increases, rms have an incentive to increase their price since they get more market power in the given market segment. When a rm increases its price, it will lose some low-type as well as high-type consumers. Since low-type consumers are more mobile, the rm will lose more low-type consumers. Thus, it is more favorable for rms when the transportation cost of low-type consumers increases since this makes low-type consumers less mobile, resulting in a lower decrease in demand after a price increase. Thus, the equilibrium price increases more when s increases.
After analyzing the static model under full information, we now turn to a dynamic model in which rms do not know the market specication and they try to learn the demand for their good using market observations.
Market dynamics under learning
When rms do not know the market structure, they need to learn the demand function to nd the optimal action. When rms apply least squares learning, they approximate the true demand function with a perceived demand function and they estimate the unknown parameters of it using past observations about prices and production levels.
We assume that the only information the rms have about the market is that there are three rms. Thus, they do not know either about the circular-road structure of the market or about consumer heterogeneity. Firms are competing with each other on the same market over time and they can observe the prices charged by their competitors and the corresponding demand for their own good (but not those of their competitors). Thus, rms gather information about the market over time and they use this information to learn about the demand for their product.
In the following subsection we specify the learning method the rms use and then we discuss the equilibria of the model under learning.
Least squares learning
Firms approximate the demand for their product with a linear function. The perceived demand function of rm i is given by
where a i denotes the demand intercept, b ix denotes the eect of rm x's price on the demand for rm i's product (x = i, j, k) and ε i is a random variable with mean 0. Parameters a i and b ix are estimated with OLS regression using observations about past prices and own-production levels.
Firms might not want to use all past observations for the estimation therefore we need to make a distinction between a rm's observations and information set. Observations of rm i consist of the prices of all three rms and the demand rm i faces for all past periods whereas the information set contains only those observations that are used in the regression.
8 The rationale behind not using all observations in the regression is that older observations might carry less information about current demand conditions than more recent ones, especially when there is a structural break in the data. Even though demand conditions are xed in the model we consider, not using all past observations, as we will see, has important consequences for the properties of LSL.
Let us suppose that rms use the last τ observations in the regression. Then parameter estimates for rm i are given by the standard OLS formula
where
is the 4×1 vector of parameter estimates 9 , X i,τ is the τ ×4 matrix of explanatory variables (constant and price observations for the last τ periods) and y i,τ is the τ × 1 vector of the last τ demand observations of rm i (dependent variable). 10 8 Note that we use the term information set in its econometric sense and not in its game theoretical sense. 9 To simplify notation, we denote the unknown parameters of the perceived demand function as well as the corresponding parameter estimates by the same symbol. This should not be confusing as we will work only with parameter estimates from now on. 10 Similar formulas apply when rms use all past observations. The only dierence is that X and y then contain the prices and the corresponding demand for all past periods.
Given the parameter estimates of the perceived demand function, rm i maximizes its one-period
. This leads to the following best-response price:
Let us now discuss timing. At the end of period t rms have observations about all t periods. Parameter estimates are obtained by (2). In order to stress that parameter estimates are changing over time, we will denote the parameter estimates at the end of period t as a i,t , b ii,t , b ij,t and b ik,t . Since rms are determining their prices simultaneously, they can play the best response only against the expectations they have about the prices of other rms. Thus, we have to replace p j with p e j,t+1 and p k with p e k,t+1 in (3), stressing again the dependence on time. We assume that rms form naive expectations, meaning that they expect other rms to charge the same price as in the previous period: p e j,t+1 = p j,t and p e k,t+1 = p k,t . This leads to the following pricing formula for period t + 1 :
Note that prot maximization requires b ii,t > 0, that is the perceived own-price eect must be negative.
Since the perceived demand functions the rms use are not correctly specied, the parameter estimate for b ii,t might become negative. In this case, (4) does not give the perceived prot-maximizing price. Also note that when (4) yields a price that is lower than the marginal cost, the rm would make a negative prot (provided that it faces a positive demand). Thus, (4) is not applicable in this case either. In order to overcome these possible issues with LSL, we augment the method with the following rule.
Random price rule: When b ii,t ≤ 0 or (4) yields p i,t+1 < c, then rm i chooses a price randomly from the uniform distribution on a predened interval I.
Interval I is specied in Section 4. We need to impose additional rules to overcome some numerical issues that may occur when rms do not use all observations in the regression. When prices start to settle down at a given value, there might not be enough dispersion in the observations and matrix X i,τ can be close to being singular, resulting in imprecise parameter estimates. This can lead to extremely high prices for some periods. Since it should be clear for rms that large unexpected price changes result from the aforementioned issue, it is reasonable to assume that rms do not follow pricing rule (4) in this case, they rather keep their price unchanged. This leads to the following rule.
No jump rule: If (4) yields a price that is at least K times higher than the price of rm i in the previous period, then the rm will keep its price unchanged and charge the same price as in the previous period.
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When there is not enough dispersion in the price observations, matrix X i,τ can become singular, making the estimation impossible. We assume that rms keep their price unchanged in this case.
Impossible estimation rule: When (2) is not applicable due to the singularity of X i,τ , then rm i will keep its price unchanged and charge the same price as in the previous period.
It might seem as if the last two rules lead to an articial stability in the model as we require rms to use the same price as in the previous period but actually these rules exclude an articial instability.
Note that the estimation problem occurs only when the process has almost converged. Thus, rms observe that prices have settled down around some values and then the new parameter estimates lead to an unexpectedly large price. First of all rms might be reluctant to make such a big price change, secondly after observing the time series of prices it should be clear that this sudden price change comes from a numerical issue, therefore it is better not to change the price. Concerning the impossible estimation rule, when parameter estimates cannot be obtained, then rms either choose a price randomly or they x the price as we suggest.
12 Keeping the price unchanged is a more reasonable solution to this issue. In Section 4 we discuss how often the dierent rules are used in the simulations.
Let us now turn to the steady states of the process.
Equilibria under least squares learning
The system is in a steady state when neither the parameter estimates of the perceived demand functions nor the prices change. It must hold for any steady state that the true and (expected) perceived demand functions coincide for each rm at the given price vector p * , that is 11 Alternatively, we could impose an upper bound on price changes as Weddepohl (1995) . In that case rms would choose the highest possible price if (4) resulted in a too large price jump. Since large price jumps are associated with imprecise parameter estimates in the model we consider, it makes more sense not to change the price at all. 12 Note that a rule like the no jump rule or the impossible estimation rule is essential for having convergence in a model that is not subject to noise (e.g. demand shock) when rms do not use all past observations in the regression. If the process converged to a certain value, then estimation would not be possible since each observation would perfectly correspond to the steady state. Thus, it needs to be specied what happens when parameter estimates cannot be calculated.
The same condition characterizes the self-sustaining equilibria in Brousseau and Kirman (1992) and in Anufriev et al. (2013) . Thus, the steady states of the model with least squares learning are self-sustaining equilibria: rms play the best response subject to their beliefs about demand conditions (i.e. the perceived demand functions) and about the prices of the other rms, and these beliefs are correct at the equilibrium price vector. Self-sustaining equilibria can be formally dened as follows.
Denition 3.1 Price vector p * = (p * 1 , p * 2 , p * 3 ) and the parameter estimates a *
constitute a self-sustaining equilibrium if the following conditions hold for each rm i :
Condition (5) shows that rms play the best response subject to their beliefs and (6) means that beliefs are conrmed in equilibrium as the actual demand is the same as the demand the rm expects to get, and the prices of the competitors are also as expected.
It can be seen from the denition that there are many dierent self-sustaining equilibria, thus the model has multiple steady states. Proposition 3.2 species which price vectors can form a self-sustaining equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 For any price vector
Thus, prices exceed the marginal cost and each rm faces a positive demand in a self-sustaining equilibrium. Note that the condition D i (p) > 0 implies that none of the rms can be driven out of the market for both types of consumers. But it is not required that each rm should attract both consumer types. In the above result, we did not take into account that {a i , b ii , b ij , b ik } are not freely chosen but they result from estimation. Therefore not all the price vectors that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.2 can necessarily be reached, despite the fact that we can nd parameter values for which they constitute a self-sustaining equilibrium.
Since perceived demand functions are linear while the true demand functions are piecewise linear, rms cannot fully learn the true demand conditions: They can correctly learn the parameters of at most one linear part. Note that condition (6) Even though it is not the case for a general SSE, there are self-sustaining equilibria in which rms correctly learn the part of the true demand function on which they operate. Proposition 3.3 species these equilibria.
Proposition 3.3 The model with least squares learning has two self-sustaining equilibria in which rms correctly learn that linear part of the true demand function on which they operate. The Nash equilibrium of the static game is always such an equilibrium of the learning process. When
there also exists another equilibrium in which two rms charge p L = 11Ss 12S+15s + c and the third rm chooses
12S+15s + c. We refer to this equilibrium as asymmetric learning-equilibrium (ALE). 13 This is why the ALE is not a Nash equilibrium of the game under known demand. As panel e shows, the high-price rm underestimates the demand for lower prices and thus it does not perceive it more protable to charge a lower price, even though it would yield a higher prot. The intuition behind this result is the following. If a rm asks too high prices, it will not attract low-type consumers. Since rms learn about demand conditions solely from market observations, the rm in question gets information about one part of the market only and that is why it underestimates demand for lower prices.
The following proposition compares the Nash equilibrium and the ALE in terms of prices and prots.
Proposition 3.4 The following relationships hold between prices and prots in the Nash equilibrium and the ALE:
The nding about prices is in line with the fact that prices are strategic complements in the model: the high-price rm charges a higher price than in the Nash equilibrium and this gives an incentive for the other two rms to increase their price. That is why p L > p N . Concerning prots, low-price rms always earn a higher prot than in the Nash equilibrium while the high-price rm may earn a lower as well as a higher prot. Note that when π H < π N , the high-price rm reaches a suboptimal outcome even though the perceived demand function perfectly ts the true demand function locally. For intermediate values of S s , all three rms are better-o than in the Nash equilibrium thus the high-price rm is better-o by not attracting low-type consumers. For high values of S s , the high-price rm earns the highest prot. In this case the high-price rm still underestimates the demand for low prices but the perceived prot maximum coincides with the true prot maximum. On the other hand, low-price rms perceive a relatively high slope and they underestimate the demand for high prices. Their perceived prot maximum does not coincide with the true prot maximum as it would be more protable to charge a higher price. Finally, the total prot of the three rms is always higher in the ALE than in the Nash equilibrium.
13 The ALE can be viewed as a local Nash equilibrium since the low-price rms reach their global prot maximum while the high-price rm is in a local prot maximum only. See Bonanno and Zeeman (1985) and Bonanno (1988) for more details about this concept.
Since prices are higher in the ALE than in the Nash equilibrium, consumers are worse-o. Moreover, welfare (measured as total surplus) is lower. Note that for comparing the welfare in the two outcomes, it is enough to focus on transportation costs only. The reason for this is the following. The surplus of a consumer can be measured as the net utility of consuming the good: v − p − sx (or v − p − Sx), where v > 0 is the positive utility from consumption while p + sx (or p + Sx) is the total cost of purchasing the good.
14 Note that the price p is simply a transfer between the consumer and the rm, therefore it does not have a direct eect on welfare. Also note that total production is the same in the Nash equilibrium and in the ALE. Since the marginal cost of production is constant and equal for the rms, the dierence in individual production levels does not contribute to welfare dierences. Thus, from a welfare perspective, only transportation costs matter. Transportation costs are higher in the ALE than in the Nash equilibrium for two reasons. First, low-type consumers go to the low-price rms only, thus some of these consumers need to travel more compared to the Nash equilibrium. Second, the high-type consumers that are indierent between the high-price rm and one of the low-price rms, lie closer to the high-price rm than under a symmetric situation (as in the Nash equilibrium). Therefore, those high-type consumers that visit the low-price rm but would visit the other rm in a symmetric situation, travel more than in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, even though total prots are higher, welfare is lower in the ALE.
3.3
Stability of equilibria
As we have seen in the previous section, the model with least squares learning has three types of equilibria: a general self-sustaining equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. Next we will investigate which equilibria can be reached and which factors determine which of the equilibria is reached. It turns out that a special property of the information set plays a crucial role in this. Before dening this property, note that dierent price vectors may correspond to dierent demand conditions.
For example, rm i may serve both types of consumers for one price vector whereas it might serve hightype consumers only for another price vector. These price observations carry information about dierent structural parameters as they lie on dierent linear parts of the true demand function. We call price vectors in the information set of rms aligned when each rm serves the same consumer type(s) for each price vector. We distinguish two kinds of aligned price vectors. When all three rms serve both consumer types, we speak about symmetrically aligned prices. When two of the rms serve both consumer types while the third one attracts high-type consumers only, we speak about asymmetrically aligned prices. 15 We dene 14 Remember that each consumer is assumed to buy the good. This implies that v is assumed to be suciently large. 15 Note that prices could be aligned in other ways as well. For example, we could consider the case when one rm attracts both types of consumers while the other two rms attract high-type consumers only. We do not consider other possibilities these concepts formally as follows.
Denition 3.5 A set of price vectors P ⊆ R 3 + is called symmetrically aligned when all three rms attract both types of consumers for all p ∈ P :
A set of price vectors P ⊆ R 3 + is called asymmetrically aligned when rms i and j attract both types of consumers while rm k attracts only the high-type consumers for all p ∈ P :
A set of price vectors P ⊆ R 3 is called not aligned when it is neither symmetrically, nor asymmetrically aligned.
The condition
ensures that rms i and j do not drive each other out of the market for
means that rm k is driven out of the market for low-type consumers but nor for the high-type ones.
When prices are aligned, then the corresponding demand observations are consistent in the sense that they lie on the same linear part of the demand function. That is, observations carry information about the same linear demand parameters and consequently rms correctly learn the parameters that characterize the linear part of the true demand function on which they operate.
Since rms play the best response to the prices of the other rms, subject to their perceived demand function, it is important to analyze the conditions under which a set of aligned price observations remains aligned after updating the set with the best-response prices. Lemma 3.6 summarizes these conditions. Lemma 3.6 When price observations are symmetrically aligned, then updating the information set with the best-response prices always results in symmetrically aligned price observations again.
When price observations are asymmetrically aligned, there are three possibilities.
1. For S s < Σ 1 price observations will not be asymmetrically aligned after updating the information set with the best-response prices suciently many times.
For
S s ∈ [Σ 1 , Σ 2 ) with Σ 2 = 2 + √ 6 ≈ 4.4495, the updated price observations will be asymmetrically aligned if the following condition holds for the most recent price observation p :
because they are not relevant for the equilibria of the learning process, as we have seen.
3. For S s ≥ Σ 2 , price observations always remain asymmetrically aligned after updating the information set with the best-response prices.
According to this lemma, when the information set is symmetrically aligned, then it always remains symmetrically aligned. Thus, rms will learn the true parameters of the corresponding linear part. As Proposition 3.3 shows, the only equilibrium that rms may reach in this situation is the Nash equilibrium.
Concerning asymmetrically aligned observations, Lemma 3.6 says that when . On the other hand, an asymmetrically aligned information set always remains asymmetrically aligned by updating it with the best response prices when S s is high enough. Thus, the only equilibrium in this case is the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. When price observations are not aligned, then rms cannot learn the true parameters of the linear part on which they operate, consequently the only kind of steady state in the given situation is a general self-sustaining equilibrium.
Note that these results concern existence only, under specic conditions. We have not analyzed the stability of these equilibria yet. Proposition 3.7 summarizes the dynamical properties of the steady states.
Proposition 3.7 Both the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium are locally stable equilibria of the model with least squares learning.
According to the proposition, rms will reach the Nash equilibrium when initial prices are close to the Nash equilibrium price. A similar result holds for the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. Combining these considerations with Lemma 3.6, we can conclude that the model has coexisting locally stable steady states when S s is suciently high. Note that Proposition 3.7 does not cover the stability of general self-sustaining equilibria. Brousseau and Kirman (1992) show that rms do not converge to a self-sustaining equilibrium in general. The process slows down only because the weight of a new observation decreases when rms use all observations in the estimation.
Taking into account the above theoretical results, we summarize the steady states of the model in Table 1 . When rms use all observations in the estimation, then all three equilibria can occur. More specically, when initial observations are symmetrically aligned, rms converge to the Nash equilibrium. When only the last τ observations are used in the regression, then SSE cannot be reached. If there is convergence in the model, then the information set must become either symmetrically or asymmetrically aligned: if this was not the case, then there must be jumps between the dierent linear parts of the demand function, contradicting convergence. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and the ALE can be reached more often in this case for the following reason: an information set which is not aligned might become symmetrically or asymmetrically aligned as old observations drop out of the information set at some point. Thus, when only the most recent observations are used in the regression, the system can converge either to the Nash equilibrium or to the ALE, or there is no convergence at all. Since both the Nash equilibrium and the ALE are locally stable, we expect that observations will not jump between the dierent linear parts of the demand function and therefore one of the equilibria will be reached eventually. If this conjecture does not hold, then the process does not converge at all as observations keep on jumping between the dierent linear parts of the true demand function.
In the next section we run computer simulations to investigate whether rms indeed reach the Nash equilibrium or the ALE when only the most recent observations are used. We also investigate how often the dierent outcomes are reached.
Simulation results
We run simulations with 1000 dierent initializations. Each initialization runs until the maximal price change is smaller than the threshold value of 10 −8 , i.e. max i |p i,t − p i,t−1 | ≤ 10 −8 , or until period 1000 is reached. We x the market parameters at c = 1 and s = 1, and we vary the value of S. Based on the theoretical results we consider 6 dierent values, Concerning the parameters in the learning method, we x K = 5 in the no jump rule. Whenever rms need to pick a price randomly, they use the interval I = [c, p H + c]. We believe that these choices are appropriate since all the prices that are relevant for the long-run outcome of the model lie in interval I and they are always smaller than cK for the model parameters we use, thus the jump size is not restrictive. 16
We consider dierent values for τ (the number observations used in the estimation). Since there are 4
parameters to be estimated, we need at least 4 observations in the information set. We will investigate how the size of the information set aects the outcome of the simulations.
Since we conjectured to observe substantially dierent outcomes when rms use all observations compared to the case when they use the last τ observations only, we discuss the simulation results for these cases in separate sections.
Simulations with all observations
First we investigate the outcome of the model when rms use all observations for estimating the perceived demand function. In this case, rms can move towards a general SSE, they can reach the Nash equilibrium or the ALE (provided it exists). As we have shown, the latter two equilibria are reached only when the initial observations are aligned. Since initial prices are drawn randomly, information sets are typically not aligned, therefore a general SSE is reached, in which rm do not approximate correctly even that linear 16 Also note that our theoretical results do not depend on the rules that augment least squares learning. part of the demand function on which they operate.
17 Figure 4 illustrates the time series of prices in a typical simulation for S = 2. The gure shows that prices settle down fast and that rms charge dierent prices. The given simulation stopped in period 1000, the maximal dierence between the true and perceived demands at the nal price vector is 0.3 · 10 −3 , conrming that rms move towards a self-sustaining equilibrium.
As Proposition 3.2 shows, many price vectors can be part of an SSE. Therefore it is worthwhile to investigate the distribution of nal prices. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the nal prices for dierent values of S. As S increases, both the average and the median prices increase. 18 There is not much dierence in the standard deviations. Figure 5 shows histograms of the nal prices over the 1000 dierent initializations, for dierent values of S. The histograms show that there is substantial price dispersion and that neither the Nash-equilibrium nor the ALE provides a benchmark outcome when all observations are used. As S increases, the distribution seems to become atter. 17 We need 4×3 initial values for each simulation. We ran numerical simulations to investigate how often initial observations are symmetrically or asymmetrically aligned. Based on 1.000.000 simulations for each value of S we considered, initial observations are symmetrically aligned in less than 0.02% of the cases whereas they are asymmetrically aligned in less than 0.77% of the cases. 18 Note that the upper bound of the interval for initial prices also increases. In order to measure how close rms get to a self-sustaining equilibrium, we calculate the absolute dierence between the actual and perceived demands at the nal price vectors. The dierence is 0 in an SSE. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of these dierences for dierent values of S. The rst three rows show the mean, minimal and maximal absolute dierences over individual rms whereas the last three rows report the number of initializations for which the dierence is smaller than 10 −2 , 10 −3 and 10 −4 for the three rms jointly. 19
19 For comparison, the mean initial dierence (i.e. in period 5) ranges from 1 to 2 for the dierent values of S we consider. We can conclude from the table that dierences are rather small in all cases. In almost all cases, the maximal dierence is at most 10 −2 . This conrms that rms get close to a self-sustaining equilibrium when all observations are used in the regression. We practically never observed convergence to the Nash equilibrium or to the ALE.
4.2
Simulations with the last τ observations
Next we turn to the case when information sets contain the last τ observations only. Our conjecture was that information sets become either symmetrically or asymmetrically aligned in this case and rms converge either to the Nash equilibrium or to the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. From Proposition 3.3
we know that the ALE does not exist for S = 2 and S = 4, thus the Nash equilibrium should always be reached for these values of S.
As we discussed, at least 4 observations are needed for the regression. It turns out that the process does not converge typically when rms use exactly τ = 4 observations. Figure 6 illustrates the time series of prices in a typical simulation with τ = 4. The gure shows that prices do not settle down at the Nash equilibrium price. They are converging towards the Nash equilibrium (already indicating that the Nash equilibrium is locally stable) but every now and then they diverge away from it. The reason behind this is that when there is not enough dispersion in the observations, parameter estimates become imprecise and one of the rms will charge a relatively large price. When rms use 4 observations only, then the weight of a single observation is apparently large enough and the outlier observation can drive the prices far from the equilibrium.
In contrast, when rms use more observations, the weight of a single observation decreases, thus a for the last 50 periods of the simulation. It turns out that we do not nd exact convergence but small oscillations around the Nash equilibrium. This is caused by the same numerical issue that we have for τ = 4 : parameter estimates become imprecise when there is not enough variation in the observations. 20
Panels c and d depict a similar pattern for the case of the ALE.
In order to investigate whether rms always converge either to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium 20 To conrm that these oscillations are due to numerical issues we run the same simulations with using the true demand coecients when observations in the information set are aligned. In this case we always nd exact convergence to one of the equilibria. These simulations serve as a theoretical benchmark only since the true coecients are not available for rms. or to a neighborhood of the ALE, we run 1000 simulations for each (S, τ ) combination that we consider and we calculate which proportion of the nal price vectors lies in a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the ALE respectively. Figure 8 illustrates the results. For each (S, τ ) combination, the gure shows which proportion of the 1000 simulations leads to the 0.001-neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium (panel a) or of the ALE (panel b). 21 We can conclude from the gure that rms almost always reach either the Nash equilibrium or the ALE, that is prices almost always converge.
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The gure also shows that the Nash equilibrium is reached more often as τ increases. On the other hand, the ALE becomes more dominant as S increases. We will come back to these eects later.
To evaluate the eect of the numerical issue that results in not exact convergence, we ran the same simulations with rms using the true parameters of the given part of the demand function when the information set is aligned. The results (reported in panel a of Table 7 in Appendix B) conrm that rms always reach either the Nash equilibrium or the ALE. We again nd that the Nash equilibrium is reached more often as τ increases and that rms converge to the ALE more often as S increases. However, the Nash equilibrium is reached much more often than before. This shows that the numerical issue that occurs when there is not enough variation in the observations, has an important eect on which equilibrium will eventually be reached. The results suggest that the Nash equilibrium is less stable than the ALE in the sense that the numerical issue can drive prices from the Nash equilibrium to the ALE more often than the 21 We say that a vector (x1, . . . , xn) lies in the ε-neighborhood of another vector (y1, . . . , yn) if their Euclidean distance is smaller than or equal to ε :
other way around.
23 In fact, panel c of Figure 7 shows a situation where prices settle down around the Nash equilibrium initially but after a high price realization the rms converge to the ALE. This nding explains why rms converge more frequently to the Nash equilibrium when τ increases. As we discussed, when the size of the information set increases, a single observation has a smaller eect on the parameter estimates. Therefore a high price realization that may occur after prices have settled down around the Nash equilibrium, has a smaller impact on the parameter estimates, therefore the best-response prices stay in the basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium instead of reaching the basin of attraction of the ALE.
An alternative way to assess the eect of the numerical issue is to introduce noise in the model. By adding a small noise to the demand faced by rms, there will be enough variation in the observations and therefore parameter estimates do not become imprecise. We drew a random number from the N (0, 0.001 2 ) distribution in each period for each rm (independently across rms and periods) and added it to the demand faced by the rm. We focused on the case τ = 8 only. The outcomes of these simulations are similar to those when the true coecients are used in the regression (see panel b Table 7 in Appendix B).
The reason for this is that the numerical issue that occurs in the model under deterministic demand does not occur under noise and consequently there are no unexpected jumps in prices. This is also conrmed by the fact that there are hardly any switches from the Nash equilibrium to the ALE unlike in the deterministic model.
We checked the robustness of our results with respect to the number of periods in the simulations and the number of dierent initializations. We focused on the case τ = 8 and we ran two sets of simulations with the previously used values of S : one set with 10000 periods instead of 1000 and another one with 10000 dierent initializations instead of 1000. The outcomes of these simulations are shown in Table 8 in Appendix B. The outcomes are in line with our previous results. In the case of 10000 runs, we get more or less the same proportions for the dierent (S, τ ) combinations as before. 24 Therefore we conclude that our results are robust with respect to the number of simulations. However, the Nash equilibrium is reached less often when simulations ran for 10000 periods.
25 This dierence is in line with the nding that switches occur from the Nash equilibrium to the ALE but not in the other direction.
23 To investigate whether the Nash equilibrium is indeed less stable than the ALE, we analyzed the entire time series of prices for each initialization and we found that 1. prices leave the 0.001-neighborhood of the Nash more often than that of the ALE and 2. there are barely any switches from the ALE to the Nash equilibrium while there are much more switches in the other direction. 24 The mean absolute dierence between the proportions is 1.2%-point while the maximal absolute dierence is 2.6%-point over the dierent values of S. 25 The mean dierence between the proportions for the Nash equilibrium is 3.54%-point while the maximal dierence is 8.8%-point over the dierent values of S.
Finally, we investigated how often the dierent augmenting rules are used in the simulations. The results show that the random price rule is used a few times but the other two rules are hardly ever used.
26
We ran additional simulations with dierent values of K (the jump size in the no jump rule) as well. The results show that the Nash equilibrium is reached more often as K decreases. The reason for this becomes clear from panel c of Figure 7 . As we can see, prices settled down around the Nash equilibrium price initially but a large jump around period 60 moved prices towards the ALE-prices. Thus, if we allow for smaller jumps only, prices will be driven out of the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium less often. But the ALE does not disappear for smaller values of K, we still observe convergence to the ALE as well.
Discussion
This paper has focused on learning about market conditions. Firms apply least squares learning where the perceived demand function is correctly specied locally and rms can observe the actions of each other.
We have proved that the model has coexisting locally stable equilibria and we have shown that least squares learning can result in a suboptimal outcome for some rms even when the estimated function perfectly ts the market observations. This outcome, the asymmetric learning-equilibrium, was not found in the literature of least squares learning before. Our results show that rms can approximate the demand function better when they use only the most recent observations in the regression. However, the resulting market outcome can be suboptimal for some rms therefore it might worthwhile to experiment with the price (by charging a lower sales price for example) every now and then as this might ensure that rms do not get locked up in the suboptimal situation.
We have considered the Salop model with 3 rms in equidistant locations and with two types of consumers, diering in their transportation costs. Firms do not know the market structure and they apply least squares learning to learn about demand conditions. They approximate the (piecewise linear) demand function with a linear perceived demand function and they maximize their prot subject to their perceived demand function. The model has three kinds of equilibria: a general self-sustaining equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium. In a self-sustaining equilibrium rms approximate the true demand function correctly only in the equilibrium but the approximation is incorrect for out-ofequilibrium prices. In the Nash equilibrium and the ALE rms correctly learn the linear part of the true demand function on which they operate. In the ALE the high-price rm underestimates the demand for low prices and it attracts high-type consumers only. This situation is suboptimal for the rm when the two transportation costs are not too dierent. However, when transportation costs become sucintly dierent, 26 See Table 6 in Appendix B for more details.
then the high-price rm is better-o by not attracting low-type consumers. The ALE has worse welfare properties than the Nash equilibrium outcome. We have proved that both the Nash equilibrium and the ALE are locally stable, thus the model can have coexisting locally stable equilibria. When rms use all past observations in the approximation, then they typically reach a general SSE. On the other hand, when only the most recent observations are used, rms converge either towards the Nash equilibrium or towards the ALE. As rms use more observations in the regression (but not all observations), the Nash equilibrium is reached more often. In contrast, the ALE is reached more often as the transportation cost of high-type consumers increases.
In the model we have made some assumptions whose eects should be discussed. First of all, we have introduced heterogeneity on the demand side of the market. This is not an unrealistic assumption as consumers could easily dier in their transportation costs, moreover it makes the model more general.
With homogeneous consumers, the true demand function is still piecewise linear so least squares learning can lead to an SSE or to the Nash equilibrium. The ALE, however, does not exist since if a rm does not attract any consumers, then it will charge a lower price eventually since the observations with zero demand will move the parameter estimates in a direction that yields a lower price. Thus, consumer heterogeneity is essential for having an asymmetric outcome.
We have assumed that rms do not know anything about the demand structure. This assumption might sound too restrictive in the transportation cost interpretation of the Salop model. On the other hand, if we consider the product space interpretation of the circular road, then it is not unreasonable to assume that rms do not know how consumers evaluate dierent product types. From a dierent point of view, the method that the rms are using to learn about demand conditions is extremely natural. They do not assume a complicated structural model behind the data, instead they are using the simplest possible functional form in the regression. When they do not use all observations in the regression, they indeed nd that the linearity assumption is correct so there is no need to reconsider the functional form. Nevertheless, the assumption of not knowing the demand structure is crucial for the results: If rms knew the underlying demand structure, they could recover the transportation costs and the amount of each consumer type from the parameter estimates and they could nd the Nash equilibrium of the static game.
The assumption of symmetry between rms (equidistant locations, equal marginal costs of production)
can be relaxed to some extent. If locations are not far from each other and marginal costs are not very dierent, then the model has the same types of equilibria. The ALE becomes even more plausible in the sense that all three rms charge dierent prices thus it will not be suspicious for the high-price rm that the other two rms charge the same price. We assumed symmetry only to simplify calculations.
Let us now elaborate on whether our results could still hold in more general models. First note that p i ≥ c must hold for each rm in equilibrium. Otherwise the rm with the lowest price, say rm j, would always face a positive demand and would make a certain loss on each product. The rm could increase its prot by choosing a higher price for which its prot is at least 0. This can be achieved by any p j ≥ c. Now we will show that each rm must face a positive demand in equilibrium. To see this suppose that rm i is driven out of the whole market by rm j, that is p j < p i − 1 3 S. Let c ≤ p j ≤ p k without loss of generality. In this case, rm i can increase its prot by choosing the price p i = c + ε for a suciently small but positive ε. For this price rm i will not be driven out of the market since p i −
for a suciently small ε, meaning that rm i can only be driven out of the market with a price that is smaller than the marginal cost. This, as we have seen, cannot occur in equilibrium.
The condition that each rm must have a positive demand in equilibrium implies that all three rms must attract high-type consumers. Thus, equilibria can dier only in the number of rms attracting low-type consumers. There might be three possibilities: 3, 2 or 1 rm attracts low-type consumers. We investigate these cases separately.
Case 1: symmetric Nash equilibrium When all three rms attract low-type consumers, then rm i faces the following demand function:
. To see this note that there is one low-type and one high-type indierent consumer between any two rms. The low-type indierent consumer between rms i and j is at the distance
from rm i. A similar formula applies for the high-type indierent consumer and for the indierent consumers between rms i and k.
Firm i maximizes its prot with respect to its price: max
The rst-order conditions 27
27 Note that the prot functions are quadratic, with the quadratic terms having a negative coecient. Thus, the secondorder conditions are satised.
for rms 1, 2 and 3 respectively are S . To nd the optimal price, the following constrained optimization problem needs to be solved:
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield
Let us suppose that
. We need to check whether the 28 We do not have to consider marginal deviations from pN since the rst-order conditions imply that the local prot maximum is reached at pN .
where we used the formula for p N . The last condition is never satised so we can conclude that p D 1 = p N − 
The last inequality is always satised as S, s > 0. Thus, this deviation is never protable. Case 2: asymmetric situation with 2 rms serving low-type consumers Now we will show that the situation in which exactly one rm focuses only on high-type consumers, cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. Assume without loss of generality that rm 3 charges a high price such that only high-type consumers buy from rm 3: 
Prot maximization yields the following rst-order conditions (for rms 1, 2 and 3 respectively)
If a Nash equilibrium exists in the given situation, it must be the solution of these rst-order conditions.
By subtracting (A.8) from (A.7), it can be seen that p 1 = p 2 must hold. Therefore, let p 1 = p 2 = p L and p 3 = p H . The rst-order conditions then simplify to
(A.11) Subtracting (A.11) from (A.10) yields
Combining (A.10) with (A.12) gives
Plugging this expression for p L in (A.12) yields an equation that can be solved for p H . The solution simplies to p H = 2S 2 + 8Ss 12S + 15s + c.
Note that the previous calculations yield admissible prices only when 12S+15s . This deviation leads to a higher prot for rm 1 when
6S + 13s 12S + 15s
S(S + 4s) 12S + 15s > 121Ss(S + s) (12S + 15s) 2 (6S + 13s)(S + 4s) > 121s(S + s)
(A.14)
Comparing conditions (A.13) and (A.14), we nd that one of the rms always has an incentive to deviate whenever 6S 2 − 84Ss − 69s 2 = 0. Now we will show that the high-price rm has an incentive to deviate even if the previous equation holds with equality. Note that we did not consider the optimal deviation in the previous calculations. We only showed that there exists a deviation that is more protable under certain conditions. When 6S 2 − 84Ss − 69s 2 = 0 holds, rm 3 is indierent between charging p L and p H (keeping the price of the other two rms xed):
(A.15)
We will now show that the marginal prot of rm 3 is not equal to
. This implies that a marginal deviation from p 3 = p L (in the appropriate direction) yields a strictly higher prot, thus
The marginal prot of rm
Plugging in the formula for p L yields 12S+15s . This expression is always positive since S, s > 0. Thus, rm 3 can get a strictly higher prot by marginally increasing its
Combining the last inequality with
Thus, we have shown that one of the rms can always get a higher prot by unilaterally changing its price. We can conclude that there does not exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where exactly two rms attract low-type consumers.
Case 3: asymmetric situation with 1 rm serving low-type consumers Now we will show that the situation in which two rms focus only on the high-type consumers, cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. Assume without loss of generality that rm 1 charges a low price such that it attracts every low-type consumer:
In this situation the demand functions are as follows:
with the corresponding rst-order conditions for prot maximization
By subtracting (A.18) from (A.17), it can be seen that p 2 = p 3 must hold. Let p 1 = p L and p 2 = p 3 = p H . Then the rst-order conditions simplify to To simplify notation, let
price is given by
(A.21)
in an SSE, the perceived demand is given by
Note that 9 variables characterize an SSE under the simplied notation: 1 price and the 2 parameters of the perceived demand function for each rm. On the other hand, there are 6 conditions (best response price and equality of actual and perceived demands for each rm). Thus, the system of equations that characterizes an SSE might be solved, with 3 free variables. We will now show that for a given price vector
such that the system is in an SSE. .23) Combining this with the previous formula for A i yields A i under which the system is in an SSE.
Let us investigate which price vectors lead to an economically sensible perceived demand function.
That is, we want to characterize the set of prices for which b ii > 0 and A i > 0 12S+15s . We have also seen that this outcome exists only when S s ≥ Σ 1 . Even though this outcome is not a Nash equilibrium of the model with known demand, it is a steady state of the learning process. The reason behind this is that rms do not know that it would be protable to change their price unilaterally since they approximate the demand function with a linear function, implying that they do not know that they would get a much higher demand by undercutting other rms. Thus, when only 2 rms serve both consumer types and rms correctly learn the corresponding linear part of the true demand function, then the unique steady state is given by 2 rms charging p L and 1 rm charging p H . We refer to this outcome as asymmetric learning-equilibrium.
We have seen that when only 1 rm serves the low-type consumer, then rst-order conditions (A.16)-(A.18) do not yield an admissible solution. Therefore the learning process does not have a steady state in this situation.
This shows that the Nash equilibrium and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium are the only steady states in which all three rms correctly learn the linear part of the true demand function on which they bij > 0 and b ik > 0 in addition to the condition Ai > 0. Note, however, that these extra conditions do not restrict the set of admissible prices further as for a given positive Ai one can always nd values for ai, bij and b ik such that Ai = ai +bijpj +b ik p k holds and the conditions on the signs are satised. 30 Note that these are exactly the same cases that we analyzed in the proof of Proposition 2.1. 
We have seen in the proof of Proposition 2.1 that the Nash-equilibrium prot is π N = The Nash-equilibrium prot is always smaller than the prot of low-price rms in the ALE:
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Ss S+s < 121Ss(S+s) (12S+15s) 2 if and only if 4(12S + 15s) 2 < 1089(S + s) 2 , which reduces to 0 < 9S + 3s. This inequality is always satised.
Next we show that the Nash-equilibrium prot is larger than the prot of the high-price rm in the ALE only if S s is low enough. Finally, we show that the total prot of rms in the Nash equilibrium is always smaller than in the ALE.
Using the previous formulas, 3π N < 2π L + π H reduces to 6s(4S + 5s) 2 < 121s(S + s) 2 + 2(S + 4s) 2 (S + s).
This simplies further to 0 < 2S 3 + 43S 2 s + 50Ss 2 + 3s 3 . This inequality is always satised as S, s > 0.
A.5
The proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof.
When price observations are aligned, estimation yields the true parameters that characterize the given linear part of the demand function. Under symmetrically aligned price observations the parameter estimates are given by a i = (see Case 1 in the proof of Proposition 2.1 for the corresponding demand function). Thus, using (3), the best response of rm i is 
is also satised. Thus, adding the best-response prices to the price observations gives a symmetrically aligned set again.
31
When rms i and j attract both types of consumers while rm k attracts high-type consumers only, then rms learn the following demand parameters:
(see Case 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.1 for the corresponding demand functions). Using (3), the best-response prices are given by 
We will rst show that the condition
is always satised. Using the formula for p BR k −p BR j , the condition simplies to 
is always satised.
31 Notice the contraction mapping feature of playing the best-response price. This implies that symmetrically aligned prices converge to the same value. Since prices are best response to each other, rms will reach the Nash equilibrium in this case. 32 Note the contraction mapping feature again, which implies that the low-price rms will reach the same price if the information set always remains asymmetrically aligned. 
The left-hand side of the inequality is greater than or equal to Since price observations were asymmetrically aligned,
As we have seen, playing the best response works as a contraction mapping for the low-price rms, therefore p j − p i → 0 if the information set always remains asymmetrically aligned. Thus, . Thus, when the latter condition does not hold, then an asymmetrically aligned information set cannot stay asymmetrically aligned.
A.6
The proof of Proposition 3.7
We will now show that both the Nash equilibrium and the ALE are locally stable equilibria. First we will describe the system in the neighborhood of the equilibria and then we show that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are always less than 1 in absolute value. First we focus on the Nash equilibrium.
Part 1: Stability of the Nash equilibrium When prices in the information set are symmetrically aligned, then rms learn the correct demand parameters of the linear part on which they operate. Moreover, as we have seen in Lemma 3.6, updating the information set with the best-response prices results in a symmetrically aligned information set again. the Nash equilibrium is locally stable.
Part 2: Stability of the ALE When prices in the information set are asymmetrically aligned, then rms learn the correct demand parameters of the linear part on which they operate. Moreover, as we have seen in Lemma 3.6, updating the information set with the best-response prices results in an asymmetrically aligned information set again when S s > Σ 2 . 33 Thus, the parameters of the perceived demand functions do not change in this case.
Suppose that rms i and j are the low-price rms and rm k is the high-price rm. Then the perceived demand function of rm i is always given by D P i (p) = > Σ2 does not hold, we can consider a suciently small neighborhood of the ALE for which the updated information set is asymmetrically aligned. This can be done as (A.25) holds for (pL, pL, pH ) whenever the ALE exists. S+s . This is smaller than 1 in absolute value if and only if 4S + 3s < 8(S + s), which is satised for any S, s > 0.
Thus, all three eigenvalues are smaller than 1 in absolute value, implying that the ALE is locally stable.
B Robustness check
We report the results of the robustness checks in this section. First we summarize the baseline results in Tables 5 and 6 . For each (S, τ ) combination we ran 1000 simulations and we investigated how often prices lie in a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium or of the ALE. Table 5 shows 4 numbers for each (S, τ ) combination. The upper values refer to the Nash equilibrium whereas the lower ones to the ALE.
The numbers that are not in brackets correspond to the 0.001-neighborhood of the given equilibrium while the numbers in brackets show the proportion of nal price vectors in the 0.0001-neighborhoods. 34 As we have discussed before, there is no exact convergence in the model, that is why not all the outcomes lie in the small neighborhood of the equilibria. 34 Remember, a vector (x1, . . . , xn) lies in the ε-neighborhood of another vector (y1, . . . , yn) if their Euclidean distance is smaller than or equal to ε : Table 6 reports information about the usage of the dierent augmenting rules discussed in Section 3.1. For each (S, τ ) combinations we considered, we counted how many times each rule was used during a given initialization and then we calculated the average, the median and the mode of these numbers over the 1000 dierent initializations. The table reports the range of these statistics over the dierent (S, τ )
combinations. Note that each rule could have been used 996 · 3 = 2988 times as each rm could use each rule in each period except for the initial ones.
Next we report the results that exclude the eect of the numerical issue that leads to imprecise parameter estimates. Panel a of to the model, we consider bigger neighborhoods of the equilibria than in Table 5 : The reported numbers correspond to the 0.01 and 0.001-neighborhoods (in brackets) respectively. Notice that the proportions for the 0.01 neighborhoods are quite close to those under the true coecients.
Finally, Table 8 summarizes the results of simulations with 10000 runs and with 10000 periods for the case τ = 8.
35 The values for (S, τ ) = (10, 20) do not add up to 100%. This is caused by the no jump rule: In some simulations one rm got stuck with its last randomly drawn price as the best-response price was too high compared to their most recent price and thus the no jump rule prevented the price change. In these simulations rms reached neither the Nash equilibrium, nor the ALE. However, if we turn o the no jump rule, then such situation does not occur. Table 8 : Outcome of simulations with 10000 periods and 10000 dierent initializations. The proportion of outcomes in the 0.001 and the 0.0001-neighborhoods (in brackets) of the Nash equilibrium (upper numbers) and the asymmetric learning-equilibrium (lower numbers) for dierent values of S and τ = 8. Other parameters: s = 1 and c = 1.
